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Abstract
This paper investigates the determinants of the rms decision to issue corporate bonds
in emerging Asian economies, using a novel database covering the period 1995 to 2004.
We use comparable micro level panel data for 4 countries - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia
and Thailand - to explore the inuence of rmssize and growth prospects, nancial
health and indicators of bond market development on the decision to issue corporate
bonds. Our results show that the likelihood of bond issuance increases with size and
growth prospects and with creditworthiness in all countries; there is evidence of rm-
level heterogeneity across rm size classes. Importantly, there is no e¤ect from bond
market development on the likelihood of bond issuance. We conclude that the benets
of bond market development are yet to spillover to corporate bond markets.
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cation: F32, F34, G32
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1 Introduction
The Asian region has long recognized that it has relatively small bond markets. Both
sovereign and corporate bonds outstanding are small as a percentage of GDP in relation
to other nancial markets such as loans and equities in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; only Japan and Korea are exceptions in this regard,
but even here the scale of the bond markets is closer to European than US levels as a
percentage of GDP. Figures reported in Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) suggest
there is considerable variation between countries, and by comparison with other emerging
markets notably in Latin America, the scale of bond markets in relation to broad money or
domestic credit is small, which reects the small bond market and the great dependence of
Asian economies on bank nance (see Eichengreen et al. (2006)).
The vulnerability of this position for corporations seeking external nance was underlined
with the onset of the Asian crisis. Corporations were dependent on bank nance in domestic
and foreign currency to supplement internal cash ow for investment, with smaller and
medium sized enterprises almost exclusively dependent on domestic bank loans. Domestic
banks in turn depended on short-term dollar denominated funds to nance these domestic
currency loans creating a potential currency mismatch between assets and liabilities on their
balance sheets. With the crisis the funding to banks and then to corporates fell dramatically,
and in the absence of local bond markets to provide alternative sources of nance for rms
and banks, the real e¤ects of the crisis were amplied.1
In the post-crisis period, building deep and liquid regional bond markets has became a
priority to provide the means to free Asian economies from excessive dependence on bank
intermediation and to foster the development of a more diversied and e¢ cient nancial
sector, and there is evidence that they are growing (see Fernandez and Klassen (2004)). But
the level of bond market capitalization is low and results from the fact that bond markets
are separated by country, with low liquidity, limited investor participation, underdeveloped
infrastructure and few intermediaries. They are unable to create the critical mass required
for adequate liquidity, which is widely regarded as between $100-200bn (See McCauley and
Remolona (2004) and Eichengreen et al. (2006)), since all emerging Asian countries excepting
Korea, and more recently China and India, have failed to reach this level. Until a market
reaches this critical size, trading volumes remain low, bid-ask spreads will be wider than
comparable markets elsewhere (if not constrained by market regulations as many are in
Asia) and both issuers and investors will remain few in number.
On the positive side, large strides have been taken to improve the bond markets at
the country and regional level. Governments have issued increasing numbers of sovereign or
quasi-sovereign bonds to establish a yield curve o¤which corporate bonds can be priced. The
range of institutional investors has increased, the infrastructure improved to ensure prices and
volumes are recorded more quickly, and ratings agencies are beginning to provide information
on bond issues. The regional initiative to establish an Asian Bond Fund to purchase dollar
and local currency government bond issues through the Pan Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF)
1The most severe experiences were in those countries with the most highly leveraged companies prior to
the crisis Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. Much of the corporate debt was foreign currency denominated
therefore the reversal of capital inows with the subsequent depreciation of the exchange rate had a sharp
adverse e¤ect on investment and output.
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and the Fund of Bond Funds (FoBF) has resulted in a deeper sovereign bond market and the
Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) proposal brought by the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers
has spurred a number of initiatives to create a more integrated regional bond market.
The purpose of this paper is to ask the question - has the development of country level
and regional initiatives had any impact on corporate bond issues? It is clearly the intention
to encourage the corporate bond market to grow as the sovereign bond market has done.
We ask whether any progress has been made to date through the policies that have been
implemented. We address the question by assessing the probability that a rm will issue a
corporate bond in Asian markets. To assess this we control rst for the factors that might be
expected to inuence this decision at the rm level. First, we allow for the size and growth
opportunities facing the rm, which are major determinants of the decision to issue bonds,
since for large rms bond funding is economically viable, while for small rms it is not, and
for growing rms the scale of funding required makes bond issues attractive. Second, the
nancial health of rms is another important determinant since the creditworthiness of rms
as evidenced by healthy balance sheets will inuence the willingness of arms length lenders
to provide bond nance - we can expect that a rm that has indications of poor nancial
health will not attempt to raise funds from bond markets. Having taken these rm-specic
inuences into consideration we then assess the impact of bond market development thus far
in Asia. While the focus to date has been on sovereign and quasi-sovereign bond markets but
we might expect the increase in size and liquidity to improve the environment for corporate
issuers.
This is the rst attempt to model the probability of bond issuance in emerging markets
(other studies by Pagano et al. (1998) and Datta et al. (2000), and Hale and Santos (in
press) study the probability of bond issue in developed countries) and this complements the
approach taken by Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Eichengreen et al. (2006)
who consider the bond market capitalization to GDP or domestic credit and bond maturity
across emerging markets as a function of economic and institutional characteristics.
In the following sections of the paper we will discuss the probit methodology, which
relies on the use of rm-level panels for Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand over the
period 1995-2004, to evaluate the probability that a rm will issue a bond given its size,
growth prospects, nancial condition and also the development of the bond market. Our
conclusions suggest that so far at least bond market development has little or no impact
on the probability of a rm issuing a bond in the Asian markets. By far the most important
consideration is the size of the rm and its growth prospects.
2 Empirical specication and estimation methodology
2.1 Baseline model
In this study we model the rms decision to issue corporate bonds. The most suitable
methodology for this purpose is the probit model, which provides an estimate of the prob-
ability that a rm will issue a bond based on a range of relevant variables. There is a
literature on this approach to bond nance, beginning with Pagano et al. (1998) and Datta
et al. (2000) who ask why rms enter the securities markets, and more recently, Hale and
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Santos (in press) complement the above studies by analyzing the timing of the rms decision
to issue a bond IPO in the United States.
In this paper we assume that there is an underlying response variable, yit , the decision
to issue a bond as a function of the vector of determinants of issuance, Xit. This is dened
by the regression relationship, with slope parameters given by the vector  and intercepts
accounting for group e¤ects i, and a normally distributed error term it :
yit = Xit + i + it (2.1)
In practice, yit is unobservable, and what we observe is a dummy variable yi dened by
yi =
(
1 if the rm issues a bond at any time in the sample period,
0 if the rm is a non-issuer.
yi = 1(y

i > 0)
yi = 0(y

i = 0)
(2.2)
The likelihood is constructed from observing the probability of observing outcomes yi given
the observed determinants, Xit, hence
L =
NY
i=1
Pr(yi = 1 j Xit;;i)yi Pr(yi = 0 j Xit;;i)1 yi
and we maximize the log likelihood
lnL(;i j Xit) =
NX
i=1
(yi ln Pr(yi = 1 j Xit;;i)+(1  yi) Pr(yi = 0 j Xit;; i)
where Pr(yi = 1 j Xit;;i) = F (Xit+i) and Pr(yi = 0 j Xit;;i) = 1 F (Xit+i), to
obtain parameter estimates  and iand thereby to establish the impact of the determinants
and the group e¤ects. The reported coe¢ cients on the determinants can be adjusted to
establish the marginal e¤ect of a change in the element of xit 2 Xit on Pr(yi = 1 j Xit;;i)
by calculating
@ Pr(yi = 1 j Xit;;i)
@xit
= F (Xit + i):b
where b is the estimated parameter on element xit.
The choice of explanatory variables, Xit, is based on size and growth opportunities,
nancial health and indicators of bond market development. It is widely recognized that
a rms size plays an important role in determining access to public nance, Datta et al.
(2000), and is expected to increase the probability of a bond issue. Large rms tend to
issue securities, while smaller rms with more severe information problems tend to borrow
from banks and private creditors. In addition, a large and growing set of empirical ndings
supports the view that otation costs make bond nancing unattractive to small rms intent
on raising small amounts of funding from the market: Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) and
Krishnaswami et al. (1999) show that otation costs of public issues make this funding
source economically viable only for rms seeking large amounts of funding. To control for
size we follow Calomiris et al. (1995). Growing rms are more likely to issue bonds than rms
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that have fewer opportunities for expansion because it is easier to nance their investment
projects (see Pagano et al. (1998) and Datta et al. (2000)).
The nancial condition of the rm is also an important determinant of access to external
nance as argued by Leland and Pyle (1977), Rajan (1992) and Bougheas et al. (2006)).
We consider four dimensions of nancial health from the balance sheet, namely leverage,
protability, solvency and collateral assets in total assets. Considering the likely response
of the probability of bond issue to these variables we remark that high leverage can be
associated with an unhealthy balance sheet and therefore rms with levels of debt face
greater di¢ culties obtaining funds on the markets, especially during recessions (see Cantor
(1990) and Bougheas et al. (2006)). Should this e¤ect prevail, one would observe a negative
relationship between leverage and the likelihood of bonds issuance. Yet, some authors argue
that the probability for public nance increases for rms high leverage (see Pagano et al.
(1998), Datta et al. (2000), Dennis and Mihov (2003) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006))
since a high rate of leverage can be seen as an indicator of a good credit standing and high
borrowing capacity of rms. If this is the case, we would expect a positive relationship
between leverage and the probability to issue bonds.
Dennis and Mihov (2003) and Santos and Winton (forthcoming) argue that bond nanc-
ing should be viable for rms with high prots. Therefore, the more protable rms the more
likely to issue bonds. In other words, we expect a positive relationship between protability
and the probability to issue corporate bonds.
As an additional balance sheet indicator, we employ the solvency ratio, which has been
used in earlier studies (Mateut et al. (2006)), as an indicator of the liquid assets of the
rm. As with leverage this variable can have a coe¢ cient of either sign, since solvency
indicates both the need to raise funds due to low shareholder equity, and a signal of low
creditworthiness.
Finally we include a measure of collateral which seeks to proxy for the rms ability to
pledge collateral for debt nance. Access to collateral assets were very important in studies on
debt composition (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Booth et al. (2001)). Assets
that are more tangible, sustain more external nancing because tangibility increases the value
that can be recaptured by creditors in case of borrowers default (Almeida and Campello
(2007)). Thus we expect to nd that high values of collateral increase the probability to
issue corporate bonds.
Having controlled for rm-specic variables we can turn our attention to the development
of the Asian bond markets in recent years. It is widely recognized that greater securitization
in the sovereign bond market provides a yield curve o¤ which the corporate issues can be
priced (Hirose et al. (2004)) and encourages xed income dealers to establish themselves
in the markets, which they might not otherwise do (Harwood (2000)). It is a reasonable
hypothesis to suggest that bond market development even if it is largely conned to the
public sector debt market could be a spur to corporate bond issues. Lejot et al. (2008) make
similar arguments.
Hirose et al. (2004) indicate that the scale of government issues of bonds has increased
over time with issues being made on a scheduled basis, which has helped to establish a
benchmark yield curve o¤ which other bond issues can be priced. In addition, the range
of investors encouraged to participate in bond markets has widened to include institutional
investors such as private pension funds, insurance companies, investment trusts and this has
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been aided by lowering the bureaucratic hurdles involved with registration and participation.2
Besides institutional investors, governments have encouraged foreign investor participation
by liberalizing the domestic nancial markets allowing foreigners to invest by reducing ex-
posure to withholding taxes on returns or reporting requirements when purchasing or selling
assets, although the level of participation is very low as documented by Burger and Warnock
(in press). In some markets foreign entities have been encouraged to issue bonds themselves.
Asian authorities have sought to increase participation in the markets further by improving
the infrastructure for market participants by improving the settlement process to enhance
the immediacy and transparency of the trading process and the engagement of international
rating agencies and local agencies to rate issues in local currency, which reduces information
asymmetry in the markets.3
Perhaps the most prominent initiative has been the move towards a regional bond market,
and here there have been two major developments. First, following discussions among the
senior executives of the regional central banks, the Asian Bond Fund was launched in 2003.
Initially this was a commitment by 8 East Asian and Pacic countries to set aside $1bn
of reserve assets in a closed end fund to purchase dollar denominated Asian government
bond issues, referred to as the ABF1. The ABF2 initiative, launched in 2005, extended the
project to local currency government bond issues through the Pan Asian Bond Index Fund
(PAIF) and the Fund of Bond Funds (FoBF). The investment was enlarged to $2bn per
country in an open ended fund which was opened to private sector investors - Eichengreen
et al. (2006) report that the PAIF grew by 13% in its rst 6 months of operation reecting
private sector participation. Second, an Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) proposal to
the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers meeting in Manila 2003 has spurred a number of initiatives
to develop regional bond markets including a) the intention to create a robust primary and
secondary market for bond by large sovereign bond issues by Asian governments and quasi-
government agencies to establish benchmarks, b) Asian government nancial institutions
nancing requirements to be met in Asia, and c) a series of new ventures to create asset-
backed securities markets, bond issues by multilateral development banks and government
agencies, and bonds to fund foreign direct investment in Asian countries. Several working
groups have been established to take these forward.
To allow for the development of the bond market we consider the bond market securiti-
zation and the trading volume within each country as indicators of growing size and activity
in the markets. These indicators are allowed to inuence the probability of corporate bond
issue directly and indirectly through interactions with rm-specic variables, which we will
discuss below. In a test of robustness we evaluate this proposition with alternative variables
to measure relative size (the ratio of bond to equity market capitalization) and liquidity
(turnover of bonds in primary and secondary markets). Our results are unchanged.
2Previously, the main institutional investors had been local banks and government pension funds, which
were buy-to-hold investors that did not enhance turnover in these markets. The lack of diversity among
these investors tended to mean markets were dominated by participants on one side of the market i.e. buyers
or sellers.
3The move to paperless trading in Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand for both gov-
ernment and corporate bonds is almost complete, while the reporting of the price and volume of trades in
Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand ensures that the secondary market for bonds can
utilise recent information.
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The resulting probit model has the following format:
Pr(BONDi = 1) = F (a0+a1SIZEi(t 1)+a2GROWTHi(t 1)+a3LEV ERAGEi(t 1)+a4PROFi(t 1)+
+ a5SOLVi(t 1) + a6COLLi(t 1) + a7SECURt + a8TRV OLt + ui + uj + ut) (2.3)
where BOND is a dummy variable that equals 1 if rm i issued a bond in year t, and
0 otherwise. F(.) denotes the standard normal distribution function. Our specication
includes regressors evaluated at time t-1 to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns.4 ut
represents a full set of time dummies accounting for common trends and business cycle
e¤ects and uj, a full set of industry dummies to control for xed e¤ects across industries.
2.2 Interactions based on rm size and bond market development
There are strong reasons to suppose that large rms will have higher probabilities of issuing
bonds due to their ability to overcome informational asymmetries associated with their
creditworthiness, therefore we interact the rm size with the nancial variables and observe
the impact of interactions on the issuance probabilities across di¤erent rm classes. We
estimate the following modied version of Equation 4.3:
Pr(BONDi = 1) = F (a0 + a1SIZEi(t 1) + a2GROWTHi(t 1) + a3SECURt + a4TRV OLt+
+ a5FINANCIALi(t 1)  SMALLit + a6FINANCIALi(t 1)  (1  SMALLit) + ui + uj + ut)
(2.4)
Here the vector FINANCIALi(t 1) denotes our set of nancial variables, which is iden-
tical to the variables used to measure nancial health in the previous model i.e leverage,
protability, solvency and collateral. (SMALLit) is a dummy variable for rms in the lower
quartile of their size distribution of all rms in that particular industry and year, and 0
for rms in the upper quartile of their size distribution. We allow rms to transit between
size classes.5 This specication is aimed at evaluating whether the e¤ects of the nancial
variables on bond issuance decisions are stronger for smaller rms, which are more likely to
be excluded from bond markets due to information imperfections.6
Similarly, we aim to assess whether the response to rm-specic characteristics varies with
the development of the Asian bond market. Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and
Eichengreen et al. (2006) illustrate that bond market development has many dimensions, but
size and liquidity are two major determinants that inuence the incentive of rms to issue
bonds. To test this hypothesis, we modify Equation 4.3 to contain interaction terms with
4 We corroborate our ndings using regressors at time t. Both empirical models suggest a common story.
These results are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request.
5 For this reason, our empirical analysis will focus on rm-years rather than simply rms. See Guariglia
(in press) for a similar approach.
6 Using interaction terms allows us to avoid problems of endogenous variable selection; to gain degrees of
freedom; and to take into account that rms can transit between groups.
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variables proxying for bond market development. Using the size of securitized bond markets
relative to GDP and the trading volume as development indicators (DEV ELt) we interact
these with the set of nancial variables employed in the previous models. These interactive
terms tell us how the response to these variables changes when bond market develops, as
indicated by the level of the indicators. Thus, the estimated model becomes:
Pr(BONDi = 1) = F (a0 + a1SIZEi(t 1) DEV ELt + a2SIZEi(t 1) + a4GROWTHi(t 1)
+ a4GROWTHi(t 1) DEV ELt ++a5FINANCIALi(t 1) DEV ELt+
+ a6FINANCIALi(t 1) + a7DEV ELt + ui + uj + ut) (2.5)
We report results separately for each of the above mentioned indicators.
3 Data
3.1 The data sources
The data on bond issues are drawn from Bondware and Bloomberg, rm-specic character-
istics from the balance sheet and prot and loss accounts are taken from Thomson Financial
Primark and bond market development indicators are from the Asian Development Bank.
These are combined in a new way to cast light on the probability of corporate bond issuance
in the Asian region.7 The data cover four emerging Asian countries namely Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand and span the time period 1995 through 2004, which spans the period
of major bond market development following the Asian crisis of 1997.
We use Bondware to identify all corporate bonds issued in international markets. This
database contains information about the issue dates, denomination, currency and the ma-
turity in the bonds measured. We are also able to identify the type of the coupon (i.e zero
coupon, xed and oating). For the purpose of our analysis we focus on xed rate bonds.
We use Bloomberg to identify similar data for rms that issue bonds in the domestic Asian
markets. Our coverage of bond issues therefore embraces both rms with issues in hard
currencies, which are almost exclusively US $ denominated, and rms with local currency
denominated bonds. Although local currency issuance rst started to capture the markets
attention in the late 1990s new issues in local currency now exceed new issues in dollars for
most countries therefore it is important to consider both the local and international currency
issues in the Asian markets in order to avoid mis-representing corporate bond issuance.
The Thomson Financial Primark database o¤ers balance sheet and prot and loss ac-
counts data for rms in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Following normal selection
criteria used in the literature, we exclude companies that did not have complete records for
all explanatory variables and rm-years with negative sales and prots. To control for the
potential inuence of outliers, we exclude observations in the 0.5 percent from upper and
lower tails of the distribution of the regression variables.
Our explanatory variables are SIZE, measured by the logarithm of sales, and GROWTH,
measured by growth in sales. Leverage (LEV) is calculated as total debt over total assets, to
7 We are grateful to the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research for providing the data for the Asian
rms.
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measure the rms overall indebtness; the protability ratio (PROF), is dened as earnings
before interest and taxes relative to total assets, to measure a rms ability to generate
prots; the solvency ratio ( SOLV) is measured by shareholdersfunds over total assets; and
nally collateral (COLL) is dened as tangible assets over total assets.
Bond market development indicators are taken from the Asian Development Bank. We
use two indicators to assess the development of the Asian markets: the market securitization
as a percentage of nominal GDP and the trading volume in US dollar value terms reports
local currency corporate bonds transacted in the secondary markets i.e. the US$ value of
local currency corporate bonds transacted in the secondary markets.
Our combined sample contains data for 275 rms in Indonesia, 576 in Korea, 833 in
Malaysia and 411 in Thailand that operated between 1995 and 2004 in a variety of sectors
including manufacturing, utilities, resources, services and nancials. By allowing for both
entry and exit, the panel has an unbalanced structure which helps mitigate potential selection
and survivor bias. Our sample presents two characteristics that make it especially appealing
for our analysis. It includes rms with investment grade and high yield bonds, and this is
helpful since rms with high yield bond issues are more likely to be characterized by adverse
nancial attributes and weak balance sheet.8 The sample also spans a wide range of sectors
of Asian economies. This is useful since Bernanke et al. (1996) suggested the importance of
nancially constrained rms is generally greater in sectors other than manufacturing.
3.2 Description of the data
Summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis are provided in Table
1A. We also present a percentile distribution of our nancial variables across countries and
periods in Table 1B. When describing the data, we are interested in three issues, rst, the
comparison of those rms with access to bond markets versus those with no bonds, and
second, whether there is heterogeneity in the rmsbalance sheet characteristics.
Examining Table 1A, we observe that size and growth opportunities are very di¤erent for
issuers and non-issuers. Firms with bonds issues are always larger and have higher growth
opportunities. The gures for size are reported as logarithms of sales and therefore mask
to some degree the extent of the scale di¤erences. Dennis and Mihov (2003) and Hale and
Santos (in press) indicate that larger rms have more public debt and Datta et al. (2000)
nds that the likelihood of bond issues is increasing in the rms size and need for external
funding.
For nancial indicators we nd that rms with access to bond markets (Issuers, where
BOND=1) sometimes have more favorable indicators than for rms that are non-issuers
(Non-Issuers, where BOND=0) but not always. Issuers have more tangible assets in their
total assets but this is not necessarily an advantage for bond issuance, unlike bank nance
where tangible assets can be pledged as collateral. These rms are able to obtain higher
debt to total assets, which may be a positive signal to bond markets that these rms are
creditworthy, but it could also indicate that they are more indebted. In two of the countries
the issuers are more protable, but in all cases they have lower solvency. Lower solvency
8 The ratings variable contains a large number of missing values since many Asian rms are not rated.
Nevertheless, we are able to observe both investment grade and speculative grade ratings.
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may create incentives to issue bonds but would also be an adverse signal of creditworthiness
in the markets. Houston and James (1996), Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Dennis and Mihov
(2003) and Hale and Santos (in press), have found that more creditworthy rms operate
with relatively more public debt, therefore we would expect these variables to inuence the
probability of bond issuance in Asian countries.
Table 1B reports the percentile distribution of our rm-specic variables, and here we
can examine the nature of the heterogeneity across di¤erent types of rms. Table 1B reports
statistics for all years for each country at the 25th , 50th and 75th percentiles. Several
observations are worth noting. First, we nd that there are considerable di¤erences in
the debt to asset ratios across the distribution, irrespective of the country under scrutiny.
There is increasing leverage (LEV) for rms as we progress from the 25th, 50th and 75th
percentiles, and rms at the 75th percentile are twice as large as rms at the 25th percentile
indicating that rms in the upper quartile of the leverage distribution are signicantly more
levered compared to those in the lower quartile of the corresponding distribution. Second,
we document similar di¤erences in the percentile distributions for solvency (SOLV) and
collateral (COLL). For rms belonging to the 25th percentile of the each distribution there
are lower levels of solvency and collateral than for rms at the 75th percentile, with the 25th
percentile being between one third and a half of the 75th percentile. There is a less noticeable
increase in protability across the distribution, but there is still considerable heterogeneity.
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of the size of securitization and trading volume
respectively. Both gures paint a similar picture. We observe that Korea and Malaysia
look much better in terms of securitization and trading volume compared to Indonesia and
Thailand, especially after the 1997 crisis. In fact, while the di¤erences in securitization
are less noticeable, liquidity is unprocurable in Indonesia and Thailand. These gures are
consistent with the study by Eichengreen et al. (2006) in which Asian bond markets are
less developed in terms of liquidity compared to their Latin American counterparts but have
higher bond market capitalization.
4 Main results
In this section we report the estimation results for the probit models. Unless otherwise speci-
ed the columns of each Table indicate the estimation results based on separate country panel
estimates for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. We begin with a baseline model to
examine the relationship between rm-specic characteristics and the rms probability to
issue bonds. We then augment this baseline model using interaction terms to identify the
asymmetric e¤ect of the nancial factors. Finally, we interact our nancial variables with
Asian bond indicators to explore whether rms are inuenced in their decision to issue bonds
by the development of the bond market.
Table 2 reports the estimates for the baseline model. As expected the size of the rm
has a positive impact on the probability to issue a bond in all four countries, indicating
that the larger is the rm the more likely it is to issue bonds. This result conrms the
information asymmetry problem that small rms face and is consistent with those of Fama
(1985), Calomiris et al. (1995), Johnson (1997), Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Cantillo and
Wright (2000), and Dennis and Mihov (2003), showing that larger rms access the bond
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market with higher probability because they are associated with lower degree of informational
asymmetry. Similarly the growth in sales indicates that rms are more likely to seek bond
nance for three out of four of the Asian countries. We conclude that there is a minimum
e¢ cient scale to overcome before bond nance is economically feasible and the extent of
bond nancing increases with scale, but also, when there are funding needs driven by growth
in sales then bond nance is sought. The results are also economically signicant. The
marginal e¤ects (not reported for brevity) suggest that a unit increase in the rms size would
increase the probability of issuing corporate bonds in Korea by 0.11 percentage points and
that of Thai rms by 0.08 percentage points. Similar e¤ects were found for growth prospects.
Increasing the growth in sales by one unit would raise the probability of bond issuance in
Korea by 0.11 percentage points and that of Thai rms by 0.07 percentage points. The
nancial health indicators show that creditworthiness has a role to play in determining the
probability of bond issue. Firms with high leverage (LEV) are more likely to issue corporate
bonds compared to those with low leverage, which suggests that higher debt to total asset
levels is likely to be a signal of creditworthiness to the bond markets. Protability (PROF)
- where it is signicant - has a positive coe¢ cient showing that the greater the protability
of the rms the higher the probability to issue bonds, and is therefore a clear indicator of
creditworthiness. Solvency (SOLV) and collateral (COLL) generally have a positive inuence
on access to bond markets but there are exceptions. We expect a positive coe¢ cient for SOLV
since, although low liquidity rms may have higher demands for external funding, rms with
less liquidity would be less creditworthy and therefore more likely to obtain nance, if at all,
from banks rather than bond markets according to the pecking order theory. The positive
and signicant coe¢ cient in Indonesia and Thailand suggests that the pecking order theory
dominates in these countries. The negative and signicant coe¢ cient for Korea occurs for a
di¤erent reason. As Figure 1 indicates, the ratio of total debt to stock market capitalization
fell more sharply in Korea than other countries, which suggests that there was a desire to
issue more equity and less debt following the Asian crisis. Therefore stockmarket equity in
total assets was rising as debt issues were falling in this episode, explaining the negative
coe¢ cient we observe. Similarly, we expect a higher proportion of tangible assets in total
assets to indicate greater creditworthiness and this explains the benecial e¤ect of collateral
on bond issuance for Indonesia and Malaysia, which have positive coe¢ cients. The negative
coe¢ cient for Thailand may indicate the benets of collateral are largest for rms seeking
bank rather than bond nance, where collateral can be pledged against a loan. These
ndings conrm that there is a signicant association between the probability to issue bonds
and rmsnancial health.
Having controlled for the rm-level determinants of bond issuance, we now turn our
attention to indicators of bond market development (securitization and trading volume).
Without exception these variables have coe¢ cients values that are insignicantly di¤erent
from zero suggesting that the development of bond markets in recent years in terms of
scale and liquidity have had a negligible inuence on issuance probabilities. Despite the
suggestion that deeper bond markets with greater liquidity provide a positive stimulus to
corporate bond market issuance, we nd no evidence for these e¤ects in emerging Asia. The
reported coe¢ cients indicate the direct e¤ects of bond market developments, but before
drawing nal conclusions we will look for indirect e¤ects of bond market development on
the inuence of rm-specic characteristics for corporate bond issues. Before we do so we
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consider the impact of heterogeneities between rms, and most importantly size.
4.1 Di¤erentiating the e¤ects of the nancial variables across rm
size classes
To consider whether the strength of the rm-specic variables di¤ers across rm size classes
we split the sample of rms into small and large using the lower and upper quartile distrib-
ution of the rms real total sales. By comparing the coe¢ cients for rms of di¤erent sizes
we can measure the impact of rm size on the degree of response to balance sheet char-
acteristics. It is expected from theoretical considerations based on information asymmetry
and from empirical studies that small rms are more likely to be nancially fragile and will
therefore face greater hurdles in order to access to bond markets than large rms (see Fazzari
et al. (1988, 2000)).
Comparing columns of Table 3 allows us to investigate the specic inuence of the size of
the rm and by comparing the sign and signicance of the coe¢ cients from smalland large
rms we are able to assess the impact of size on access to bond markets. The results are
clear cut. For small rms, where they are signicant, indicators of creditworthiness based
on leverage, protability and solvency all have a negative impact on the probability that
a rm will issue bonds. Only collateral assets mitigate the e¤ects of these other variables
when rms are small. We support the nding in Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999)
that collateral assets are an important determinant of debt structure, especially for small
rms.
For large rms on the other hand we nd that collateral is unimportant since it has
insignicant coe¢ cients, but for leverage and protability these variables have a positive
inuence on the probability to issue bonds as indicated by positive and signicant coe¢ cients.
The result that high-revenue generating rms issue bonds reported for developed countries
by (Pagano et al. (1998) and Dennis and Mihov (2003)) in which rms with higher prots
are more likely to issue debt publicly, relative to both bank loans and other private debt,
seems to be upheld in our study, but only for large rms. Once again the negative e¤ect of
solvency in Korea appears in the data. The results in this table indicate that the negative
coe¢ cient is associated with rms that are large and may very well indicate a shift from
bond to equity nance.
After allowing for rm heterogeneities we continue to nd that size has a positive e¤ect
on the likelihood that a rm will issue corporate bonds and that the likelihood of bond
issuance is greater for fast growing rms. The impact of bond market development in terms
of securitization and trading volume has no inuence.9
4.2 Responses to bond market development
Thus far our discussion has focused on the direct e¤ects of bond market developments after
controlling for size, growth in sales and nancial characteristics of rms. We now turn our
attention to the question whether the bond market developments have had an indirect e¤ect
9 We also include a set of time dummies to control for common trends and business cycle e¤ects, and a
set of industry dummies to control for xed e¤ects across industries.
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on rms through size, growth and nancial variables. We report how the response to rm-
specic characteristics varies with bond market development by constructing interactions
between our nancial variables and the bond market indicators (securitization and trading
volume). These interactive terms tell us how the response to these variables has changed
with bond market development. Our results are reported in Table 4A and B, for market
securitization and the trading volume respectively.
Considering securitization rst, we nd that there are no improvements in interactions
for size and growth variables, therefore the rms for which we found a positive e¤ect of their
scale and opportunities were not more likely to issue bonds as a result of the increase in
bond market securitization. Likewise, there is almost no variation in the impact of rm-
specic variables as bond markets develop. We nd only two cases where the probability of
bond issuance increases with greater size of the bond market: these are the e¤ect of leverage
(LEV) in Korea and solvency (SOLV) in Indonesia. We nd a further case where market size
has a large negative impact on probability of issuance through protability (Thailand). But
there are no other e¤ects. In other words, we show that the indirect inuence of the bond
market development on nancial factors, as measured by the signicance of the coe¢ cient
on interacted terms, is marginal.
A similar story is revealed for trading volume as an indication of market liquidity. Neither
size nor growth characteristics were inuenced by greater trading volume and among the
nancial variables we experienced no cases where trading volume increased the probability
of bond issue, in fact the reverse was true in one case where protability has a negative
impact on issuance in Indonesia.
To ensure that our results do not emerge from particular measures of size and liquid-
ity based on securitization and trading volume we report additional tests of bond market
development based on relative size of bond markets (in relation to stock markets) and an
alternative measure of liquidity using turnover. The former is calculated as total debt out-
standing over stock market capitalization and shows the extent of the development of bond
market relative to equities. The latter is an indicator of the e¢ ciency of the market and
shows the extent of trading in the secondary market relative to the amount of bonds out-
standing. We depict the evolution of these bond indicators over our sample period in Figures
3 and 4. Our results are robust to alternative measures of bond market development. Table
5A and B present the results for debt to equity ratio and the bond market turnover respec-
tively. All tests are modications of estimated models in Table 4A and B. We continue to
nd that there is marginal e¤ect of bond market development on nancial variables. We note
that there is one case where the debt to equity ratio is signicant indicating an e¤ect on
the probability of bond issuance. We can conclude that bond market development negligibly
impacts on the likelihood of bond issuance through balance sheet indicators, and this result
is not conditional only on size and liquidity indicators.
This section has shown that the responses to rm-specic characteristics negligibly di¤er
with the degree of the bond market development since our interacted explanatory variables do
not have signicant coe¢ cients. We conclude that, while the development of sovereign bond
markets has been a worthwhile and benecial development in Asian countries, the spillover
e¤ects for corporate bond issuance have been negligible. We conclude with Eichengreen
et al. (2006) that while Asian countries have made important steps to improve bond market
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capitalization, compared other emerging economies such as Latin American countries, there
is still some way to go before the markets function as developed markets do. At present the
most inuential factor in determining the probability of a bond issue is the size and growth
opportunities of the rm, with a certain amount of inuence from the nancial health of the
rm.
5 Conclusion
Financial integration in Asia varies across capital markets and the development of regional
bond markets is in the top of the list for policy makers, see BIS (2005). This paper examines
the determinants of bonds issuance using a novel dataset for four emerging Asian economies
- Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand - allowing for the size and growth of the rm,
and the nancial health of the rm. It then asks whether bond market developments have
contributed to the probability that a rm will issue bonds. We allow for direct and indirect
e¤ects on other rm-specic variables. We show that size and growth are major determinants
of the decision to issue bonds, while balance sheet variables have an inuence as indicators of
creditworthiness. When we assess the impact of bond market development on the likelihood
of bond issuance, however, we nd negligible e¤ects suggesting that the impact of the regional
bond market initiatives has yet to a¤ect the corporate bond market. These results are robust
to many specications, controls and a wide variety of bond indicators.
Where does this leave the e¤orts of the authorities in Asia to improve the bond market
infrastructure, investor participation, depth, liquidity and sophistication? The promotion
of the sovereign bond market has been a helpful and necessary step before the corporate
bond market can grow, and there are important steps being implemented that will enhance
the markets further. For example, moves to de-restrict short selling to allow traders to
hedge positions and permit market making, foster inter-regional and international trading
to deepen the markets and extend the bond market initiative (see Hirose et al. (2004)). Re-
laxation of foreign exchange restrictions and harmonization of tax codes to ensure markets
are not segmented will improve inter-regional and international trades. Under the ABMI,
Asian countries collectively may seek to provide credit guarantees either through existing
guarantors or by establishing a regional guarantee facility particularly with a view to en-
couraging bond issues by small and medium sized enterprises, to improve the information
structure in the bond market through ratings agencies with regional competence and an in-
formation service on issuers and ratings agencies, to improve foreign exchange transactions
and settlement for cross-border transactions to deepen markets; to draw on market research
and technical assistance and to enhance the infrastructure by legislating on company law,
securities transaction regulations and tax requirements. All of these developments will spur
the bond market and create conditions for corporates bond issues.
Further research on the inuence of bond market development is warranted since the
results reported here pool international and local currency corporate bond issues and do
not distinguish between investment and speculative grade bonds. It is possible that certain
segments of the corporate bond market may have responded more favorably than others to
the increase in market size and liquidity in recent years. These distinctions are on the agenda
for future research.
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A Data appendix
Table 1: Variable denition
Variable Denition
Leverage Total debt over total assets
Protability Earnings before interest and taxes relative to total assets
Solvency Shareholdersfunds over total assets
Collateral Tangible assets relative to total assets
Size Logarithm of sales
Growth Growth in sales
Securitization Size of outstanding securitization as a percentage of GDP
Trading Volume US$ value of local currency corporate bonds
Removal of outliers: To control for the potential inuence of outliers, we excluded observations
in the 0.5 percent from upper and lower tails of the distribution of the regression variables.
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Table 1A
Statistics
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
Issuers Non Issuers Issuers Non Issuers Issuers Non Issuers Issuers Non Issuers
SIZEit 12.01 10.62 13.50 11.93 11.30 10.50 12.19 10.63
GROWTHit 0.01 0.016 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.082 0.04 0.002
LEVit 0.46 0.38 0.42 0.29 0.35 0.25 0.49 0.39
PROFit 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03
SOLVit 0.33 0.38 0.29 0.44 0.42 0.48 0.31 0.42
COLLit 0.46 0.39 0.40 0.35 0.46 0.41 0.44 0.43
Observations 260 2369 1395 2969 857 7105 476 3761
Notes : The Table presents sample means. The subscript i indexes rms, and the subscript t, time, where t = 1995-2004.
SIZEit: Logarithm of sales. GROWTHit: Growth in sales. LEVit: Total debt to total assets. PROFit:Earnings before
interest and taxes relative to total assets. SOLVit: Shareholdersfunds over total assets. COLLit: Tangible assets relative to
total assets. Currency units are US$
Table 1B
Distribution
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
All years All years All years All years
25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75
SIZEit 9.84 10.86 11.85 9.74 10.51 11.45 11.30 12.24 13.42 9.84 10.72 11.60
GROWTHit -0.153 0.05 0.22 -0.08 0.08 0.23 -0.182 0.02 0.189 -0.161 0.02 0.161
LEVit 0.17 0.37 0.56 0.17 0.33 0.48 0.07 0.22 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.56
PROFit 0.006 0.04 0.10 0.004 0.07 0.04 0.008 0.05 0.10 0.003 0.05 0.11
SOLVit 0.21 0.40 0.59 0.24 0.38 0.55 0.35 0.51 0.69 0.27 0.42 0.60
COLLit 0.23 0.38 0.57 0.22 0.36 0.51 0.22 0.41 0.51 0.22 0.41 0.58
Notes : The Table presents percentile distribution. The subscript i indexes rms, and the subscript t, time, where t =
1995-2004. SIZEit: Logarithm of sales. GROWTHit: Growth in sales. LEVit: Total debt to total assets. PROFit: Earnings
before interest and taxes relative to total assets. SOLVit: Shareholdersfunds over total assets. COLLit: Tangible assets
relative to total assets. Currency units are US$
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Table 2
Baseline model
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
SIZE 0.421*** 0.368*** 0.214*** 0.980***
(7.19) (15.3) (8.03) (12.3)
GROWTH 0.164 0.385*** 0.281*** 0.868***
(1.16) (4.61) (3.16) (4.01)
LEV 1.309** 1.104*** 1.182*** 1.799***
(2.45) (3.98) (5.43) (3.61)
PROF -0.141 0.582* 0.486* -1.062
(-0.30) (1.73) (1.81) (-1.49)
SOLV 1.105** -0.494* 0.285 0.917***
(1.97) (-1.95) (1.61) (2.60)
COLL 0.901*** 0.100 0.398** -1.327***
(3.02) (0.52) (2.29) (-3.21)
SECUR -0.048 0.063 -0.015 -0.669
(-0.051) (0.74) (-0.14) (-1.01)
TRV OL -0.010 -0.000 0.000 -0.021
(-0.92) (-0.26) (0.012) (-0.32)
Constant -4.069*** -6.157*** -4.194*** -5.084***
(-4.21) (-10.5) (-5.76) (-9.38)
Observations 1182 2438 2903 703
R2 0.23 0.24 0.13 0.47
Notes: Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. All nancial variables are lagged one period.
SECUR is an indicator which shows the size of outstanding securitization as a percentage of nominal GDP.
TRVOL is a liquidity indicator which shows the US$ value of local currency corporate bonds transacted in
the secondary markets. Time and industry dummies were included in all the regressions. * signicant at
10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 3
Size classes
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
SIZE 0.173*** 0.323*** 0.094*** 0.361***
(2.84) (4.93) (3.08) (9.11)
GROWTH 0.131 0.326*** 0.168** 0.445***
(1.12) (3.29) (2.02) (3.28)
LEV  SMALL -0.572 1.001 -0.575** -0.812**
(-1.48) (1.64) (-2.18) (-2.52)
LEV  (1  SMALL) 0.245 0.949* 1.325*** 1.414***
(0.77) (1.77) (5.43) (6.85)
PROF  SMALL 0.775 0.569 0.037 -1.433***
(0.98) (0.72) (0.069) (-2.67)
PROF  (1  SMALL) 0.671 2.607** 1.378** 0.082
(1.02) (2.28) (2.15) (0.11)
SOLV  SMALL -1.010** -0.593* -0.876*** 0.078
(-2.22) (-1.68) (-4.92) (0.24)
SOLV  (1  SMALL) 0.140 -1.643*** 0.120 -0.316
(0.39) (-2.72) (0.71) (-1.13)
COLL  SMALL 0.983*** -0.610 0.910*** -0.382
(2.80) (-0.98) (2.84) (-0.82)
COLL  (1  SMALL) 0.065 0.809 -0.288 0.027
(0.13) (1.31) (-1.31) (0.11)
SECUR -0.224 0.006 -0.020 0.014
(-0.31) (0.12) (-0.19) (0.46)
TRV OL -0.008 0.000 0.001 -0.019
(-0.78) (0.76) (0.077) (-0.78)
Constant -3.475*** -5.419*** -2.261*** -5.382***
(-4.56) (-5.42) (-3.30) (-9.88)
Observations 1182 2438 2903 703
R2 0.22 0.24 0.11 0.33
Notes: Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Type is equal to 1 for rms in the lower
quartile of their size distribution in year t, and 0, for rms in the upper quartile of their size distribution.
SECUR is an indicator which shows the size of outstanding securitization as a percentage of nominal GDP.
TRVOL is a liquidity indicator which shows the US$ value of local currency corporate bonds transacted
in the secondary markets. All nancial variables are lagged one period. Time and industry dummies were
included in all the regressions. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 4 A
Development-Securitization
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
SIZE 0.458*** 0.372*** 0.211*** 1.125***
(6.85) (9.77) (5.79) (5.44)
SIZE DEV EL -0.242 0.007 0.008 -0.623
(-0.76) (0.17) (0.17) (-0.34)
GROWTH 0.084 0.353** 0.384*** 1.491
(0.32) (2.53) (3.60) (0.89)
GROWTH DEV EL 0.309 0.047 -0.205 -7.101
(0.37) (0.29) (-1.11) (-0.41)
LEV 1.255** 0.747** 1.103*** 2.541**
(2.25) (2.25) (4.66) (2.34)
LEV DEV EL 0.337 1.086** 0.559 -1.209
(0.26) (2.35) (1.36) (-0.068)
PROF -0.558 0.252 0.355 1.355
(-0.69) (0.56) (1.11) (0.76)
PROF DEV EL 1.798 1.053 0.302 -52.698*
(0.48) (1.22) (0.41) (-1.72)
SOLV 0.826 -0.487* 0.321* 0.966
(1.52) (-1.65) (1.65) (1.09)
SOLV DEV EL 2.458* -0.028 -0.058 8.525
(1.65) (-0.087) (-0.18) (0.56)
COLL 0.970** 0.306 0.478** -1.817**
(2.51) (1.19) (2.27) (-1.97)
COLL DEV EL -0.414 -0.481 -0.336 2.922
(-0.24) (-1.17) (-0.84) (0.23)
DEV EL 0.241 -0.167 -0.082 -0.041
(0.63) (-0.31) (-0.14) (-0.28)
Constant -4.633*** -6.194*** -4.185*** -12.649***
(-4.47) (-9.53) (-8.71) (-5.40)
Observations 1182 2438 2903 703
R2 0.24 0.25 0.13 0.50
Notes: Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. DEVEL is an indicator which shows the size
of outstanding securitization as a percentage of nominal GDP. All nancial variables are lagged one period.
Time and industry dummies were included in all the regressions. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%;
*** signicant at 1%.
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Table 4 B
Development-Tr. Volume
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
SIZE 0.396*** 0.430*** 0.356 0.682***
(5.75) (3.93) (1.35) (8.99)
SIZE DEV EL 0.008 -0.002 -0.003 0.005
(1.16) (-0.59) (-0.53) (0.42)
GROWTH 0.191 0.126 -0.828 0.471**
(1.26) (0.28) (-0.65) (2.00)
GROWTH DEV EL -0.008 0.001 0.024 0.033
(-0.33) (0.53) (0.86) (0.73)
LEV 1.449** 1.007 0.355 1.236***
(2.23) (0.78) (0.17) (2.97)
LEV DEV EL -0.060 0.000 0.020 0.017
(-0.41) (0.087) (0.49) (0.30)
PROF 0.365 1.827 3.183 -0.166
(0.76) (1.06) (1.30) (-0.26)
PROF DEV EL -0.336* -0.004 -0.054 -0.032
(-1.91) (-0.73) (-1.09) (-0.20)
SOLV 1.258* -1.393 -1.729 0.409
(1.76) (-1.18) (-1.04) (1.02)
SOLV DEV EL -0.079 0.003 0.042 0.013
(-0.48) (0.79) (1.25) (0.20)
COLL 0.886*** -0.225 -0.020 -0.120
(2.72) (-0.26) (-0.013) (-0.31)
COLL DEV EL 0.022 0.001 0.008 -0.044
(0.27) (0.39) (0.25) (-0.63)
DEV EL 0.241 -0.167 -0.082 -0.041
(0.63) (-0.31) (-0.14) (-0.28)
Constant -4.933*** -6.611*** -6.536** -8.986***
(-4.06) (-4.37) (-2.01) (-8.85)
Observations 1182 2438 2903 1999
R2 0.24 0.24 0.14 0.37
Notes: Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. DEVEL is a liquidity indicator which shows
the US$ value of local currency corporate bonds transacted in the secondary markets. All nancial variables
are lagged one period. Time and industry dummies were included in all the regressions. * signicant at 10%;
** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 5 A
Development-Debt to equity
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
SIZE 0.430*** 0.373*** 0.187** 0.790***
(4.21) (7.84) (2.10) (9.52)
SIZE DEV EL -0.006 -0.001 -0.000 -0.019
(-0.10) (-0.086) (-0.004) (-1.12)
GROWTH 0.718** 0.530*** -0.057 0.762**
(2.55) (2.63) (-0.26) (2.56)
GROWTH DEV EL -0.226** -0.035 0.209 -0.031
(-2.18) (-0.94) (1.39) (-0.48)
LEV 1.330* 0.775** 0.785** 1.046**
(1.95) (2.08) (2.18) (2.19)
LEV DEV EL 0.001 0.039 0.271 0.063
(0.005) (0.80) (1.14) (0.89)
PROF -1.065 0.145 0.243 -1.176
(-0.97) (0.17) (0.35) (-1.22)
PROF DEV EL 0.457 0.066 0.137 0.193
(0.98) (0.46) (0.29) (1.04)
SOLV 1.138 -0.892** 0.060 0.526
(1.59) (-2.37) (0.16) (1.20)
SOLV DEV EL -0.041 0.092 0.193 -0.008
(-0.16) (1.57) (0.81) (-0.089)
COLL 1.123* 0.757* 0.771* -0.318
(1.73) (1.92) (1.92) (-0.68)
COLL DEV EL -0.120 -0.117* -0.240 -0.001
(-0.41) (-1.80) (-0.82) (-0.008)
DEV EL 0.008 0.001 -0.007 1.046**
(0.01) (0.002) (-0.01) (2.19)
Constant -5.202*** -6.221*** -3.898*** -10.264***
(-4.07) (-8.22) (-3.75) (-9.69)
Observations 1182 3194 5335 1999
R2 0.25 0.24 0.13 0.38
Notes: Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. DEVEL shows the amount of total debt
outstanding over stock market capitalization. All nancial variables are lagged one period. Time and
industry dummies were included in all the regressions. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; ***
signicant at 1%.
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Table 5 B
Development-Turnover
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
SIZE 0.425*** 0.409*** 0.331 0.663***
(4.44) (4.46) (1.26) (8.34)
SIZE DEV EL 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.50) (-0.46) (-0.43) (0.73)
GROWTH 0.578* 0.288 -0.818 0.366
(1.83) (0.76) (-0.64) (1.55)
GROWTH DEV EL -0.005 0.002 0.006 0.001
(-0.71) (0.24) (0.85) (1.09)
LEV 1.188* 1.807** 0.632 1.036**
(1.69) (2.29) (0.20) (2.41)
LEV DEV EL 0.0001 -0.0001 0.004 0.002
(0.72) (-0.94) (0.22) (1.10)
PROF -1.319 2.301 1.904 0.043
(-1.06) (1.37) (0.38) (0.065)
PROF DEV EL 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.007 -0.002
(0.96) (-1.04) (-0.23) (-0.54)
SOLV 1.405** -0.756 -1.879 0.119
(2.07) (-1.15) (-0.75) (0.29)
SOLV DEV EL 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.002
(0.22) (0.44) (0.85) (1.14)
COLL 1.504** - 0.173 1.201 0.170
(2.07) (-0.22) (0.46) (0.44)
COLL DEV EL -0.0001 0.0002 -0.005 -0.003*
(-0.52) (0.35) (-0.34) (-1.67)
DEV EL -0.001 0.004 0.009 -0.003
(-0.60) (0.30) (0.49) (-0.70)
Constant -5.560*** -6.539*** -5.840* -8.838***
(-4.27) (-5.13) (-1.81) (-8.20)
Observations 893 2438 1590 1999
R2 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.38
Notes: Robust z-statistics are reported in the parentheses. DEVEL measures the extent of trading in
the secondary market relative to the amount of bonds outstanding. All nancial variables are lagged one
period. Time and industry dummies were included in all the regressions. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant
at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Figure 1: Securitization
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Figure 2: Trading Volume
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Figure 3: Debt to equity
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